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ABSTRACT
It has been known for a long time that inventory fluctuations are
of great importance in business cycles. But inventory fluctuations are
fundamentally a short—period phenomenon. Consequently, annual data may
shed relatively little light on the nature of inventory fluctuations; most
of the "action" may be played out within the year. For this reason,
economists know precious little about inventory behavior before World War II.
This paper seeks to lift this veil of ignorance in two ways. First,
we create ——fromsome admittedly incomplete and imperfect data —-monthly
time series on inventory holdings in manufacturing, durable manufacturing,
and nondurable manufacturing. To our knowledge, these are the first such
series ever made available.(The data are available on request.) Second,
we apply to the prewar data certain statistical procedures and models that
are in coumton use with postwar data. In this way, we can address the central
issue of the paper: Has inventory behavior changed?
While we do not wish to overstate the case, we were struck more by
the similarities in inventory behavior between the prewar and postwar
periods than by the differences. But the relevant stylized facts and
regressing are displayed below, and each reader can make up his or her
own mind.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Inventory fluctuations are of great importance in business
cycles. Indeed, to a surprisingly large extent, business cycles
are inventory fluctuations ——especiallyduring recessions and in
the early stages of recoveries. This basic feature of business
cycles has been known for a long time, at least since the seminal
work of Abramovitz (1950).
But inventory fluctuations are fundamentally a short— period
phenomenOn. Stocks of all types ofinventoriestypically amount
to about three months's sales, and even large changes in
inventories amount to only a week's sales or less. Consequently,
annual data may shed relatively little light on the nature of
inventory fluctuations; most of the "action" may be played out
within the year. For this reason, economists know precious little
about inventory behavior before World War II.
This paper seeks to lift this veil of ignorance in two ways.
First, we create ——fromsome admittedly incomplete andimperfect
data ——monthlytime series on inventory holdings in
manufacturing, durable manufacturing, and nondurable
manufacturing. To our knowledge, these are the first such series2.
ever made available. We offer these data in the data appendix to
this volume in the hope that others will find them useful.
Second, we apply to the prewar data certain statistical
procedures and models that are in common use with postwar data.
In this way, we can address the central issue of this conference:
Has the business cycle changed?
While we do not wish to overstate the case, we were struck
more by the similarities in inventory behavior between the prewar
and postwar periods than by the differences. Considering the
tremendous changes in the nature of American industry, in
inventory management practices, in forecasting, and in the
amplitude of business cycles, the degree of similarity was
surprising tous.But the relevant stylized facts are displayed
below,, and each reader can make up his or her own mind. -
Therest of the paper is organized into three main sections.
Section II documents the dominant role of inventories in
recessions. Here the facts are fairly well known. Section III
investigates some less well—known aspects of the variances of
production, sales, and inventory investment which one of us
(Blinder (1981, 1984)) has recently emphasized using postwar
data. In Section IV, stock-adjustment models similar to those
popularized by Lovell (1961) are fit to data covering 1929—1983
and subperiods. At least qualitatively, the results are rather
similar in the prewar and postwar periods. Section V is a brief
conclusion.3.
II.INVENTORIES IN RECESSIONS
In a previous paper (Blinder (1981)), one of us documented
the dominant role of inventory swings in cyclical contractions.
The data presented there are repeated and extended in Table 1.
PanelA shows the peak—to—trough movements in real GNP and
real inventory investment in the eight postwar recessions, using
quarterly data.1 With the single exception of the
"mini—recession"of 1980, which some people think should never
have been designated a recession, the important role of inventory
movements is evident. Taking each recession as one observation,
inventory changes have accounted, on average, for 101% of the
total peak-to—trough change in real GNP. Or, keeping score in a
different way, the mean peak—to- trough change in inventory
investment is 68% of the mean peak-to- trough change in GNP.2
Panel B, which is restricted to annual data, shows that a
similar pattern prevailed in prewar recessions. In fact, the
dominance of inventory fluctuations looks even more dramatic
here.
However, this may be an artifact of using annual data. As
can be seen in Panel B, several "recessions" display no decline
in GNP on an annual basis. To get a cleaner prewar/postwar
comparison, Panel C puts the postwar data on an annual basis.TABLE 1
Changes in GNP and in Inventory Investment during Recessions









1920—21 —3.6 —4.2 117 30
1923—24 1.5 —3.7 d 336
1926—27 1.0 —0.8 d e
1929—32 —32.0 —5.6 18 17





Change in inventoryaas a percent—

















C. Postwar recessions (peak and trough)C195 3—1954
1957—1958
196 9—19 70



























Source: Postwar data are frorn the national income and
product accounts; interwar data are adapted from Moses
Abrarnovitz,Inventoriesand Business Cycles (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1950), table 84, pp. 476—77.
a. Billions of 1972 dollars for postwar data, billions of
1929 dollars for interwar data.






Peaks and troughs of real GNP, not official dates of the
Bureau of Economic Research.
Real GNProseduring this recession.
No GNP gap in "trough" year.
TABLE 1 (continued)4.
(Twoof the eight recessions disappear in the process.) Comparing
Panels A and C shows that annual data make inventory fluctuations
look even more important than quarterly data, as we suspected.
Comparing Panels B and C suggests that inventory fluctuations
played a more predominant role in postwar than in prewar
recessions.
But,in any case, the main conclusion is obvious: There is
really no hope of understanding the dynamics of recessions
withoutanalyzing inventory behavior. Lest we be accused of false
advertising, we hasten to point out that inventories play their
main role in propagating business cycles, not in causing them. We
do not claim, and we do not believe, that business cycles are
typically initiat'd by autonomous movements in inventory
investment. In fact, as we shall show later, a crude measure of
theimpulses originating in the inventory sector suggests that
theyare rather small.
Another well—known fact about business cycles is that much
of the cyclical action comes in the manufacturing sector, and,
more particularly, in the durable manufacturing subsector. For
this reason, we tried to use our more detailed monthly data on
manufacturing to conduct a peak-to—trough analysis of inventory
investment in manufacturing and in the durable and nondurable
subsectors.
This,however, proved impossible to do in any systematic
way. One minor problem was that monthly data on manufacturing5.
output display so much volatility that picking out peaks arid
troughs was no easy matter. But the major problem was that month
to month gyrations in inventory investment are so large that ——
formost recessions --astrategic choice of endpoints can make
inventory change appear to be either a large or a small fraction
of the decline in production. Though it is hard to quantify, we
did, however, cull one basic impression from this effort:
inventory swings seems to be a less dominant force in
contractions in the manufacturing sector than in the whole
economy. This observation underscores the importance of retail
inventory movements——a point emphasized in Blinder (1981).
III. DECOMPOSING THE VARIANCE OF OUTPUT
So far we have considered only periods of recession which
are, almost by definition, special cases. A more general
impression of the importance of inventory movements in business
cycles can be obtained by asking how much of the variance of
outputis attributable to changes in inventory investment.
A. The Whole Economy
An identity relates production, sales, and inventory
investment.For the whole economy, if Y is GNP, Xis final sales,6.
and LN is inventory investment the identity is:
(3.1) Y =X+ Nt
If we then detrend each time series and take the variances of
both sides, we obtain:
(3.2) var(y) =var(x)+ var(Ln) + 2cov(x,tn),
which is a convenient way to decompose the variance of GNP around
trend.
Estimates of the elements of (3.2) invariably lead to the
conclusion that vir(y) exceeds var(x); in this sense, inventory
fluctuations are "destabilizing." This is well known. But to go
farther, or to be more precise, a serious data problem must be
confronted. The period from 1929 to 1946 contains nothing but
aberrant observations ——theGreat Depression followed by World
War II. While the precise procedure used to detrend postwar data
has little effect on equation (3.2), quite different results can
be obtained by applying different detrending procedures to the
irmentous ups and downs of the earlier data. Thus we really must
decide how to "detrend" the depression and the war.
We experimented with two procedures and ultimately settled
on one. We first developed a purely statistical definition of
trend by regressing the log of each time series in (3.1) on a7.
Constant, time, and time squared ——omittingthe years 1930—1939
and 1941-1946 on the grounds thatthey were obviously far from
trend. Two problems quickly becameapparent. First, the choice of
which years to omit from theregression is somewhat arbitrary.
Second, since each time series is detrendedseparately, and in
logs, the identity (3.1) does not addup in the detrended data,
and so (3.2) does not holdexactly. This discrepancy never
amounted to much in previous work onpostwar data by Blinder
(1981, 1984). But, in this application, the lefthandside of
(3.2) turned out to be 16% smaller than therighthand side. That
is quite a discrepancy.
So we rejected the purely statisticalapproach. Instead, we
defined trend GNPas Robert Gordon's (1984)"natural" GNP, which
he computes by applying an Okun's Lawconversion to a series for
the natural rate of unemployment. "Natural" finalsales and
"natural" inventory investment were defined,essentially, by
assuming that the mean value of X/Y observed in thesample was
the "natural" ratio of final sales to GNP. (Detailsare in
Appendix C.)
Table 2 shows the elements of equation (3.2),plus some
related statistics, for the whole period and for several
subperiods. Several dramatic differences between the 1947-1983
and 1929—1946 periods can be observed.
First, notice that the variance of detrended GNP in the
postwar period is less than one—third as large as it was in theTABLE 2
DECOMPOSITION OF THE VARIANCE OF REAL GNP
(annual data, in billions of 1972 dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Period var(y) var(x) var(n) 2cov(x,Ln) var(y) var(Ln)
(corr(x, An))VaD(x) var(x)
1929—1983 3123.72821.7 41.8260.2 1.11 .015
(.38)
1947—1983 1746.31327.1 48.7370.5 1.32 .037
(.73)
1929—1946 5992.9. 5935.3 29.5 28.0 1.01 .005
(.03)
1929—1941 1355.11109.6 28.0217.6 1.22 .025
(.62)8.
earlier period (column 1), and the varianceof detrended final
sales is less than one—fourth aslarge (column 2). In contrast,
the postwar variance of inventory investmentis actually larger
than its value in the earlier period(column 3). Thus the
remarkably more stable postwar economy did not havemore stable
inventory behavior. In consequence, inventoryfluctuations played
a much more important role in the postwareconomy than it had
previously (column 6).
Since the covariance between inventoryirivestmejat and final
sales rises tremendously after thewar (column 4, top number of
each row), x and n are much morepositively correlated in the
postwar period (column 4, bottom number). Withcov(x,n) and
var(tn) both growing larger relative tovar(x), the ratio
var(y)/var(x) increased from 1.01 before 1947 to 1.32after ——a
large increase.
A natural question to ask is: How much of thesedifferences
can be attributed to the war years? And theanswer, as Table 2
shows, is: most of it. Naturally, the variances ofGNP and final.
sales are much smaller when the waryears are excluded. What is
striking, however, is that the variance ofinventory investment
hardly changes. If we compare the 1929—1941 period tothe
1947—1983 period, we find that both the ratiovar(y)/var(x) the
correlation between sales and inventory changeare quite similar
in the two periods (see columns 4 and 5).
Thus, if we exclude the war years, a clear picture of9.
continuity in the stylized facts emerges between the prewar and
postwar periods. This is an important link to earlier work with
postwar data. Blinder (1981, 1984) called attention to two
salient features of the variance decomposition that seem to cast
doubt on the major prevailing theory of inventory behavior: the
production smoothing/buffer stock model. These features are:
(a.) The variance of production exceeds the variance of
sales, in apparent contradiction of the idea that inventories are
usedto smooth production in the face of fluctuating sales.
(b)Final sales and inventory change actually covary
positively (or not at all), not negãtive1y, in contrast to the
alleged role of inventories as a buffer stock.
Blinder (1984) shows that these two facts are not literally
inconsistent with an elaborate version of the production
smoothing model which includes cost shocks and allows for a
complicated structure of demand disturbances. Specifically, cost
shocks lead to intertemporal substitution possibilities in
production that can make it optimal for var(y) to be greater than
var(x) for a value—maximizing firm. And a particular type of
persistence in demand shocks can make it optimal for a firm to
build inventories when it experiences a positive sales shock.
Nonetheless, the facts do suggest that the theory is barking
up the wrong empirical tree in that these appendages, not the
basic theory itself, carry all the explanatory power. The central
idea of the theory is that a firm with a concave production10.
function and sales which vary over time (eitherdeterministically
or stochastically) will find it optimal to smooth production
relative to sales. Yet, in fact, output is more variable than
sales. The buffer stock motive emphasizes the role of inventories
in cushioning the effects of sales "shocks" on output. Yet
inventories rise, rather than fall, when sales rise.3
Table 2 shows that these two troublesome features of the
postwar data also characterize the earlier data, and to a
remarkably similar degree if the war years are excluded. Thus the
problems with conventional inventory theory emphasized by Blinder
(1981, 1984) did not originate in the postwar period.
B. The Manufactur}ng Sector
Manufacturing output is the most volatile component of GNP,
soit is worth seeing how a variance decomposition like (3.2)
looks using monthly data for manufacturing. Before looking at the
results, we should say something about how the prewar data on
manufacturing output, shipments, and inventories were
constructed, although the details are reserved for Appendices A
and B.
In this context, it is important to note that when the
identity (3.1) is applied to the manufacturing sector, Y denotes
production, X denotes shipments, and N denotes the stock of
finished goods plus works in progress. Inventories of materials11.
and supplies are excluded.4Unfortunately, the data available to
us did not distinguish among finished goods, works inprogress,
and raw materials, but rather lumped all inventoriestogether.
Consequently, our inventory data are not quite appropriate.
Because our general procedure was to piecetogether two of the
three time series needed for (3.1), and thenuse the identity to
infer the third,5 this data problem introducedsome unavoidable
errors into our constructed series.
For the whole manufacturing sector, we used the Federal
ReserveBoard Index of Industrial Production to createa monthly
series on output (Y) in 1929dollars. Then we combined annual
end—of—yearinventory data from Abramovitz (1950) with monthly
indexnumbers from the Conference Board Economic Recordto create
amonthly inventorystock series (N). (Details areinAppendix
A.) From these, X was created by using (3.1). Thusour synthetic
series on shipments is actually "true" shipments minusthe change
in raw materials inventories (which is unobserved).Our
constructed series on production is displayed in Figure 1. The
underlying data, as well as corresponding data on shipments and
inventories,are in the data appendix to this volume.
For the durable and nondurable subsectors, the situationwas
just the reverse. Conference Board data on monthlyshipments and
inventory stocks were used to create a synthetic "production"
series from (3.1).(Detailsare in Appendix B, and the data are
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"true" plusthe change in raw materials inventories.
With these provisos understood, let us look at the data.
Because our prewar inventory data include changes in raw material
inventories (SM) even though (3.1) excludes them, our measured




where "hats" denote measured time series. Hence our measured
series will almost certainly overstate var(n),6 and can
overstate or understate var(x) and cov(x,n) depending on how
• strongly Xand tM covary.7 The-output-ser.ies-(Y) is constructed
independently, and hence is not affected by this particular
measurement problem. Some evidence presented in Appendix A
suggests that these measurement errors are not too severe if we
stick to the levels of the variables, rather than the first
differences. So that is what we do.
But there remains the problem of "detrending" the Great
Depression and World War II, a period in which manufacturing
output first sank like a stone and then rose like a rocket, (See
Figure 1.) For manufacturing we have no "natural output" series,
analogous to Gordon's natural GNP, on which to fall back. So a
statistical procedure was imperative. We tried three13...
alternatives:
(a) peak-to-peak interpolation (in logs), using 1929 and
either 1940 or 1941 as "peak" years.
(b) estimating the 1929—1941 trend by fitting a
log—linear regression line to the monthly data.
Notice that either version of procedure (a) treats
essentially the whole period as "below trend." (The monthly data
end in 1941.) This is a funny way to define a trend, but it is
conceptually close to Gordon's "natural GNP. By contrast, a
regression line must pass through the point of means, so
procedure (b) labels half the 1929-1941 period as "above trendtm
and half as "below trend." Neither procedure is particularly
appealing. Fortunãtely, as Appendix C shows, while the choice of
the estimated variances very .muc,
ratios of variances are relatively insensitive. Hence the tables
that follow use one particular detrending procedure (peak—to—
peak interpolation between 1929 and 1941) and report only the
statistics that are "scale free."
Detrending the postwar data (1959—1982) was easier. Each
time series was detrended by the following model of the trend
component:
log Z a +bt+cDt + dAt+er
where t is time, Dt is a second time trend (for OPEC) beginning14.
at 1 in October 1973, At is zero until January 1966 and 1
thereafter, and e is a white noise disturbance. (The variable At
——usedbecause the BEA has revised the data since 1966, but not
before ——isunimportant in practice.)
Finally, we are ready to look at the results. The top panel
of Table 3 shows that the prewar data share with the postwar
manufacturinginventory and sales data the twooutstanding
characteristicsemphasizedabove:
(a) The ratio var(y)/var(x) is greater than one, in
apparent contradiction of the idea that firms want to smooth
production. This ratio is a bit smaller in the prewar period
(1.08 versus 1.15), but still greater than one. As noted above,
themodel is not literally contradicted by the finding that
varCy) exceeds var(x) because cost shocks can rationalize such a
varianceratio. Nonetheless, some statement about the nature of
shocks is part and parcel of any stochastic model of economic
behavior, and there is no doubt that the traditional production
smoothing model emphasizes demand shocks, not costshocks.8
(b) Cov(x,n) is not negative, as suggested by the buffer
stock motive for holding inventories. In fact, the covariance is
slightly more positive in the prewar period than in the postwar
period.
One noticeable difference between the two periods is the
relatively greater role of inventory variability in the (stabler)
postwar period. The variance of inventory investment is onlyTABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF THE VARIANCE OF MANUFACTURING OUTPUT
(monthly data)
(1) (2) (3)
Period var (y)/var Cx) corr Cx, n) var C Ln)/var (x)
A. Total Manufacturing
Prewar 1.08 0.25 0.012
(1929—41)
Postwar 1.15 0.20 0.063
(1959—82)
Postwar 1.26 0.23 0.056
(with errors)
B. Durable Manufacturing
Prewar 1.11 0.46 0.014
(1929—41)
Postwar 1.43 0.22 0.089
(1959—82)
Postwar 1.61 0.27 0.067
(with errors)
C. Nondurable Manufacturing
Prewar 1.05 0.12 0.035
(1929—41) -
Postwar 1.06 0.05 0.046
(1959—82)
Postwar 1.16 0.12 0.040
(with errors)15.
about 1% of the variance of shipments in the prewar period, but
rises to 6% in the postwar period. This finding in the monthly
manufacturing data echoes what we saw earlier in the annual
economy—wide data for 1929—1946, but not for 1929—1941.
The third line in each panel of Table 3 requires some
explanation. Our postwar data have been corrected (by US, not by
th BEA) to account for the facts that (a) one 1972 dollar of
finished goods in inventory represents more physical units than
one 1972 dollar of shipments, and similarly (b) one 1972 dollar
of works in progress represents more physical units than one 1972
dollar of finished goods.9 These adjustments cannot be made to
the prewar data. Also, the aforementioned problem with raw
material inventodes does not afflict the postwar data. To put
-the tWO -time periods on• a mQre equalfooting, we ..created an
"incorrect" set of postwar data in which we deliberately
introduced the wrong treatment of raw material inventories (and
calculated shipments incorrectly from the identity) and failed to
make the corrections for physical units just mentioned.
Results with these erroneous data are presented in the third
line of Table 3. In general, they suggest that the data errors
are not of enormous import.
C. Durable and Nondurable Manufacturing
Data problems are a little different in the durable and16.
nondurable sectors because here we have data on sales and
inventories (including, once again, raw material inventories) and
need to construct output. Hence our measured series are related
to the "true" series by:
Y=Y+M
tN= N+MYI.
This creates different statistical biases than those that were
present in the data for manufacturing as a whole.
Results from decomposing the variance of output in durable
and nondurable manufacturing are presented in panels B and C of
Table 3. The results for durables are rather similar to those for
all manufacturing, ekcept hatt1ieratio var(y)lvar(x) in the
postwar period is much larger in durables than in manufacturing
as a whole. Results for nondurables show a smaller var(y)/var(x)
ratio and less covariance between sales and inventory change, but
are qualitatively similar.
Thus the findings of this section seem to be quite robust.
Like the postwar data, the prewar data are characterized by (1) a
ratio of var(y)/var(x) that exceeds unity, (2) a positive
cov(x,n), and (3) a small ratio of var(n)/var(x). The major
difference between the two periods seems to be that var(y)/var(x)
is higher after the war.17.
IV. A SIMPLE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE INVENTORY CYCLE
How can we characterize the cyclical behavior of inventory
investment in a simple way? The stock—adjustment model pioneered
by Lovell (1961) seems a good place to start since it has become
the workhorse of empirical research on inventories.
The model consists of two equations. The first states that
inventory investment is some fraction of the gap between actual
anddesiredinventories, minus a fraction of unanticipated sales;
the latter represents the buffer stock role of inventories. Thus:
(4.1) Nt.:_N€ +et,-_.
where N÷i is desired inventories, _1X5 is expected sales, and
e is a stochastic error. Thesecond equation is a specification
of desired inventories, which are commonly taken to be a linear
function of expected sales:
* e (4.2) Nt÷i =A+atiX+i..
This model of inventory behavior has many defects, some of
which have already been mentioned)0 In addition, several other
problems have emerged when equations like (4.1) and (4.2) have18.
been estimated. One persistent problem is that the estimated
speed of adjustment, b, usually turns out to be too slow to be
believed.11 Despite thisapparently slow adjustment, the estimate
of c normally turns out to be near zero (and is sometimes
negative!), suggesting that production moves almost one to one
with sales.12 In addition, when such obvious "cost"variablesas
wages and interest rates are added to (4.2) as determinants of
desired inventories, they often get the wrongsign.Finally,
except for manufacturers' inventories of finished goods, the
theoretical motivation for partial adjustment is not clear.13
Despite all these reservations, the stock—adjustment model
is a simple way of putting some structure on the data,
sununarizing the time series in a way that is more meaningful than
an unrestricted vector autoregression. Obviously, t—
stock—adjustment model is a vector autoregression that has been
constrained in a particular way suggested by economic theory ——
whichhas the advantage of giving economic interpretations to the
estimated coefficients.
Note, however, that the stock adjustment model is incomplete
in that it tells us nothing about the path of final sales. Since
the X process is autonomous, the model only describes how
inventories (and, implicitly, output) fluctuate given autonomous
fluctuations in sales. Explaining fluctuations in sales goes well
beyond the purview of this paper; indeed, this volume contains
several papers devoted to this task.19.
A. Stock—Adjustment Estimates for the Whole Economy
We begin with annual data for the whole economy. To "close"
the model, we assume that expectations are formed rationally.
There are several ways to estimate rational expectations rrodels
like this one.
One way, a limited-information method suggested by McCallum
(1976, 1979), is to substitute (4.2) into (4.1) and use an
instrumental variable procedure to deal with the unobserved
expectation. But, as McCallurn (1979) notes, this technique may
notbe very promising when both the actual and the expected value
of sales appear in the equation—-which is the case in (4.1).
Another--way, a-full—information procedure suggested by
Sargent (1978), is to posit an explicit stochastic process
generating sales and then estimate the parameters of the
stochastic process jointly with the parameters of (4.1) and
(4.2), imposing the cross—equation restrictions implied by
rational expectations. This paper is not an appropriate place to
discuss the merits and demerits of limited— versus
full—information econometric procedures. Suffice it to say that
both have both.
We adopted the full-information technique under the
assumptions that (a) the disturbance e in (4.1) is AR(1), and
(b) final sales are generated by an autonomous AR(2) time series20.
process around a quadratic time trend:
(4.3) =
a0+ a1t + a2t2 + pX1 + + Ut;
As a check, we also estimated the system without the
cross—equation constraints. Much to our surprise, the constrained
estimates hardly differed from the unconstrained estimates, so we
report only the constrained estimates (with asymptotic t—ratios
in parentheses) for the whole 1929—1983 period below:




R2 =.35, rho= DW l.96 -
(1.8)
X =timetrend + 144 X1 —.44
(11.3) (3.3)
=.996DW =1.86
These estimates share the problems that are familiar from
studies of less aggregative postwar data. The estimated speed of
adjustment is quite low —-only19% per year. The coefficient of
"unexpected sales" gets the wrong sign, indicating that
unexpectedly high sales lead to inventory accumulation. More21.
probably, this coefficient indicates that our unexpected sales
proxy is not unexpected by firms, which is hardly surprising when
using annual data.14
Since the constant in the desired inventory equation is
small, the estimated marginal inventory/sales ratio is close to
the historical average inventory/sales ratio, which is .25. The
AR(2) process for final sales takes a familiar form: the
coefficient of lagged sales exceeds unity, and the coefficient of
x_2 isnegative)5
These results are less than awe—inspiring. One possibility
is that the stock-adjustment model should be applied only to the
sales of goods -—orperhaps only to durable goods ——ratherthan
to all final sa1es because there are no inventories in the
service sector. However, when we did this, the only paraneter
estimate that changed much was "a" ——whichincreased to reflect
the rising inventory/sales ratio as we moved from goods and
services to goods and then to durable goods. The parameter
estimates may be unreasonable from a theoretical point of view;
but they are robust.
The simple stock-adjustment model tracks history
surprisingly well, even during the Great Depression and World War
II. The reason, of course, is that our simple AR(2) model of
final sales fits the data quite well. The model underestimates
sales at the start of World War II, and overestimates them by
more at the end. But, considering that no special allowances were22.
made either for the war or the Depression, the tracking
performance was quite good.
Since stock-adjustment models have been estimated many times
on postwar data, but never to our knowledge on prewar data, it is
of interest to split the data and estimate the model on 1929—1946
and 1947-1983 subsamples. In splitting the sample, the number of
degrees of freedom drops precipitously —-especiallyin the
prewar period. So we eliminated the quadratic time trend. Table 4
reports the results for the whole period and for the two
subperiods •16
The results for the whole period are given only to provide a
basis for comparison with the subsample results. They differ
insubstantially from those given above, reflecting the fact that
the best AR(2) sales model hardly changes when the time trend is
omitted.
Despite the topsy—turvy nature of the economy during
19a9—1945, the estimates differ only moderately from those for
the whole sample and postwar subperiod. The main difference is
that the estimated speed of adjustment (32% per year) is much
faster in the 1929—1945 period than in the 1947—1983 period
(10%). The marginal inventory/sales ratio is quite similar in
the two periods, and the incorrectly-signed buffer stock
coefficient is smaller in the earlier period. In general,
however, the 1929—1945 and 1947—1983 estimates of the
stock—adjustment are qualitatively similar.TABLE 4
Estimates of Stock Adjustment Model: Whole Economy
Parameter 1929—19 83 19 29—1945 1947—19 83
Inventory Equation
a (inventory
accelerator) .23 .17 .21
(18.4) (3.0) (7.0)
b (adjustment
speed) .15 .32 .10
(2.4) (2.4) (1.0)




p 1.44 1.91 1.23
(11.4) (8.8) (11.5)
q —.43 —1.06 —.23
(3.3) (3.9) (2.1)
R2a -.34,..-996 -.71,.98 -.66,.996
rhob .22 .37 .28
(2.0) (2.2) (3.7)
DWa 1.97, 1.86 2.01, 1.71 2.14, 1.85
30.3 8.51 16.2 e
-
645.1 328.0 383.8 U
aphefirst number is for the inventory investment equation; the
second nmber is for the final sales equation.
bFor the inventory investment equation









Finally, and not surprisingly, the estimated AR(2)processes
for final sales are quite different in the twosubperiods.
(Remember: No special allowances were made for the Great
Depression or World War II.) Figure 2 shows how the simple AR(2)
model of final sales copes with the Great Depression and World
War II. Notice, in particular, that the beginning of the war
comes as a large positive sales surprise to the model.
Nevertheless, the fit is surprisingly good.
One interesting observation can be added here. Notice that
the variance of the disturbance term in the inventory equation——
——is estimated to be almost twice as large in the 1947—1983
period as in the 1929—1945 period. By this simple measure, then,
business cycle impulses originating in the inventory sector have
been almost twice as important since the war ended.
B. Stock—Adjustment Estimates for Manufacturing
The same stock—adjustment model can be estimated for the
manufacturingsector,and for the durable and nondurable
subsectors. Indoing this with monthly data, we modelled
shipments as an AR(12) process around a quadratic time trend,
rather than an AR(2). We do not bother reporting the many AR
coefficients, but simply confine ourselves to three remarks.
First, the coefficients in the prewar and postwar periods are not
as different as might be expected. Second, the cross—equation600-
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restrictions implied by rational expectations were againimposed
in all equations, with little effect on the estimates.Third, the
autoregression fits the data on shipments so well that there is
no point displaying its performance graphically. Even in the
tumultuous prewar period, the R2 of the autoregressions never
fall below .92.
We are more interested in the stock—adjustment equations. In
estimating these equations on monthly manufacturing data, we
added three new variables to the specification
(1) the nominal interest rate. Interest rates play an
obvious role in all theoretical inventory models, bat rarely
"work" empirically in postwar regressions. We thought it worth
finding out if thy do any better in prewar regressions. The
theoretically predicted sign is negative.
(2) expected capital gains, as generated by an
autoregression. This variable allows the two components of the
real interest rate to enter separately, rather than constraining
the coefficients to be equal and opposite.
(3) the real product wage, which serves as an empirical
proxy for wcost shocks." The theoretically predicted sign is
negative.
Each of these variables was entered in distributed lag form.17
The estimates, with asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses, are
shown in Table 5 (for all manufacturing), Table 6 (for durables),






(sum of lag coefficient)
expected capital gains
(sum of lag coefficient)
real wages




































Estimates of Augmented Stock-Adjustment Model: Manufacturing
Post—War

















rhob .85 .08 .23
(22.0) (1.2) (3.7)
aThe first number pertains to the inventory investment equation,
the second to the sales equation.
bA first—order serial correlation correction was made to the
inventory investment equation.25.
equations for the postwar period: the first uses the "correct"
data, while the second deliberately makes the two data errors
mentioned previously.
There are both differences and similarities between the pre—
and postwar estimates. Arid where notable differences emerge, the
fact that the postwar estimates with the deliberate data errors
are close to the postwar estimates with the "correct't data
suggests that the differences are genuine, not artifacts of the
data. As in the economy-wide data, we once again find an
indication that business cycle impulses originating in the
inventory sector have been larger since the war. In each case,
the variance of the residual in the inventory investment equation
is larger in 1959-l983 than it was in 1929—1941.
It is probably best to deal with the individual coefficients
variable by variable.
ADJUSTMENT SPEEDS: With one exception (all manufacturing in
the prewar period), monthly adjustment speeds are very low.18
Interestingly, there is a clear tendency to find faster
adjustment in the prewar period than in the postwar period ——
justas we found with economy—wide annual data. -
INVENTORYACCELERATOR: In all manufacturing and in
nondurables, the marginal inventory/sales ratio is much lower in
the prewar period. In durables, this tendency is obscured by the
data problems in the prewar period.
UNEXPECTED SALES: Unlike the economy-wide results, the proxy26.
for unexpected sales gets the correct (positive) signin all
equations, and is even significantly positivein several cases.
However, all of the coefficients aresmall in magnitude. So the
basic finding of a weak buffer—stock motive ismaintained.
In sum, as compared with the postwar period,the inventory
adjustment mechanism in the prewar periodin manufacturing seems
to have been characterized by (a) more rapid(but still slow)
adjustment, (b) a correctly-signed,but small effect of
unanticipated sales on inventory ixvestment,and (c) a lower
marginalinventory/sales ratio (and hence a weaker inventory
accelerator).
INTEREST RATES: The nominal interest rate variable getsthe
correct sign in all three postwar regressions (using good
data).19But it is significant only in total manufacturing,not
ineither subsector --whichraises suspicions about aggregation.
Furthermore,the expected capital gains term is correctly signed
in only one of the three postwar regressions,and the signs of
the two interest rate variables are systematically wrongin the
prewar regressions. In general,the interest rate variables do
not perform well ——whichechoes the findings of most
investigators of this issue.
WAGE RATES: Real wages get the wrong signin two of the
three prewar regressions. They get the correct signin the
postwar regressions, but are farfrom significant.2°
In general, then, neither the prewar northe postwar data
embrace the stock—adjustment model—-a matter not improved by the
-.additionof some basic cost variables suggested by economic
theory. .Again, however, we find the prewar and postwar estimates
to be quite similar, even if they fail to accord with the theory.TABLE 6
Estimates of Augmented Stock-Adjustment Model: Durable
Manufacturing
Post—War
Parameter Pre-War Good Data Bad Data
a (inventory
accelerator) 2.19 3.38 2.33
(3.3) (3.5) (9.0)
b (adjustment speed) .06 .02 .04
(2.8) (2.8) (6.0)
c (unexpected sales) .07 .01 .01
(2.0) (0.4) (0.5)
nominal interest rate 18.2 —30.1 7.8
(sum of lag coefficient) (0.4) (1.5) (0.5)
expected capital gains—.08 —.10 .33
(sum of lag coefficient) (0.4) (0.5) (1.9)
real wages —.15 —.11 —.003
(sum of lag coefficients)(0.7) (1.2) (0.5
variance of residualsa.0022, .0134 .101, .449 .059, .451
R2a .68, .97 .35, .991 .53, .991
DWa 1.96, 1.98 2.04, 1.972.09, 1.92
rho1' .34 .07 .12
(3.7) (1.1) (2.0)
aThe first number pertains to the inventory investment equation,
the second to the sales equation.
bA first—order serial correlationcorrection was madeto the
inventory investment equation.TABLE 7
Estimates of Augmented Stock—Adjustment Model: Nondurable
Man u fact u ring
Post—War
Parameter Pre—War Good Data Bad Data
a (inventory
accelerator) 0.61 1.83 1.58
(2.1) (0.9) (4.9)
b (adjustment speed) .14 .01 .03
(3.1) (0.5) (1.7)
c (unexpected sales) .05 .07 .07
(1.3) (1.8) (2.2)
nominal interest rate 57.2 —13.4 —7.0
(sum of lag coefficient) (2.3) (1.5) (0.9)
expected capital gains .50 —.15 —.17
(sum of lag coefficient) (2.2) (1.1) (1.2)
real wages .65 —.003 —.002
(sum of lag coeffi.cients)(l.8) (1.0) (0.9)
variance of residualsa .0032, .021 .031, .095 .022, .095
.54, .88 .08, .996 .23,.996
DWa 1.93,1.86 1.99, 1.97 1.95, 1.98
rhob .43 .09 .24
(40) (1.4) (3.8)
aThe first number pertains to the inventory investment equation,
the second to the sales equation.
first—order serial correlation correction was made to the
inventory investment equation.27.
V. SUMMARY ANDCONCLUSIONS
Inventoryinvestment is the most volatile component of GNP.
It plays a major role in business cycles, especially around
turning points and during cyclical downswings, and is strongly
procyclical. These facts are all well established for the postwar
U.S. economy. And everything we know from prewar data ——
includingannual national income data and monthly data on the
manufacturing sector ——suggeststhat the same stylized facts
held in the prewar period as well.
While the varfbi1ity of the other 99% or so of GNPfell
drasticáIlybetweeñ the 1929—1946 period and the l947—1983 pêod'
most of this can be attributed to the wartime gyrations of final
sales. The variability of inventory investment actually increased
after the war. Furthermore, while inventory investment and final
sales are essentially uncorrelated over 1929—1946 and strongly
positively correlated over 1947—1983, most of this difference is
also attributable to the war years. In fact, if the periods
1929—1941 and 1947—1983 are compared, the basic stylized facts
about inventories and final sales for the whole economy look
quite similar.
These stylized facts, for both the whole economy and the
manufacturing sector in both the prewar and postwar periods,
appear to contain bad news for the dominant empirical model of28.
inventory behavior ——theproduction smoothing/buffer stock
model.Inparticular, while the fact that production is more
variablethan sales does not literally contradict the model, it
certainly does move production smoothing off center stage. And
the fact that sales and inventory change covary positively rather
than negatively casts serious doubt on the empirical importance
of the buffer stock motive.
Besides this circumstantial evidence, conventional
stock—adjustment equations do not perform at all well when
estimated econometrically: speeds of adjustment turn out to be
implausibly low, the effect of "unanticipated" sales is rarely
important and sometimes incorrectly signed, and such cost
variables as interest rates and wages often (but not always) get
the wrong sign. These annoying features of the inventory data are
by now well known in postwar data. This paper shows that they
more or less characterize the prewar data as well, and that
estimated stock—adjustment models for inventory investment in the
prewar period look moderately similar to their postwar
counterparts.
The emphasis of this paper, therefore, unlike many of the
others at this conference, is on continuity, rather than on
change. Whileotheraspects of the business cycle were undergoing
a virtual transformation, changes in the nature of inventory
behavior were surprisingly small.29.
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1. Peaks and troughs are defined by movements in real GNPr which
sometimes differ a bit from NBER reference cycle peaks and
troughs.
-
2.Naturally, trough-to—peak movements, which generally cover far
longer periods of time, show no such dominance by inventory
behavior. Hence these data are not shown. However, it is well
known that GNP movements in the first few quarters of recoveries
are dominated by inventory movements.
3. Deviations of sales from trend include both anticipated and30.
unanticipated components. Thus the observed covariance between
inventory investment and deviations of sales from trend is a
composite of two effects which, presumably, differ in sign. The
evidence suggests that the anticipated component of sales
fluctuations is dominant, whereas the buffer stock model stresses
the unanticipated component.
4. Let y be goods that are fully produced within the period,z
be goods that are started, and be works in progress that are
completed. Then the change in finished goods inventories is +
— X,while the change in works in progress isz — Adding
these up and noting that Y. =+ zgives the conclusion stated
in the text.
5. This is actually what is done with the postwar data as well.
The BEA provides data on inventories and shipments, from which we
create production data to satisfy (3.1). -
6.Only if M and were strongly negatively correlated, which
is emphatically untrue in the postwar data, could measured
inventory change display less variation than true inventory
change.
7. With the magnitudes thatcharacterize the postwar period,
.var(x) and cov(x,Ln) might actually both be biased down by the31.
measurement error. But we cannot be sure.
8. McCallum's comment offers a numerical example in which demand
shocks and cost shocks apparently have equal variances, andyet
the optimal value of var(y)/var(x) for the firm is 18.7 This
example is misleading, however. By picking numerical values that
make the marginal revenue curve ten times as steep as the
marginal cost curve, McCallum makes the Lagrange multiplier (the
shadow value of inventories) ten times as sensitive to shifts in
the MC curve as to shifts in the MR curve. Thus his choice of
parameter values renders demand shocks totally unimportant, as
can be seen in his equations (13). The tremendous coefficient of
the cost shock (u)- in the output (y) equation dominates all the
others when variances are computed.
9. For a full explanation of the problem and an explanation of
our corrections, see West (1983) and Blinder and Boltz—Eakin
(1983).
10. For a discussion of these defects, see Blinder (1981, 1984).
11. Maccini and Rossana (1984) appears to be a prominent
exception. But we believe their rapid adjustment speeds to be
artifacts of their estimation technique. Blinder (1984), using
essentially the same data as Maccini and Rosanna, reports that32.
the likelihood function implied by the stock adjustment model
with first—order serial correlation in the disturbance has two
local maxima: one with rapid adjustment and high serial
correlation, the other with slow adjustment and little serial
correlation. Maccini and Rosanna use a two—step procedure that,
in practice, selects the former. But Blinder (1984) finds that
the latter is the global maximum in most industries.
12. Slow adjustment and low c have often been thought to be
contradictory. However, Blinder (1984) shows that there is no
necessary contradiction. He also shows that a negative value of c
can be rationalized if the econornetrician knows less about the
firm's sales thanthefirm does and if demand shocks have a
particular form of persistence.
13. For manufacturers' inventories of finished goods, Holt et al.
(1960) or Blinder (1982) show that the model can be derived by
maximizing discounted profits subject to quadratic revenue and
cost functions
14. Monthly regressions with manufacturing data produce the
correct (positive) sign for c, as will be seen shortly.
15. Unfortunately, this particular AR(2) model has a root that is
almost exactly unity.33.
16. Notice that the earlier sample is 1929—1945, not 1929—1946.
At first we included 1946, but discovered that this oneyear had
an extraordinary effect on all the regression estimates. it
happens that inventory investment shot up to an unusually high
level in 1946, even though final sales plunged. Though thismay
sound like normal behavior, it is not. When 1946 is added to the
regression reported in Table 4, the coefficient of unexpected
sales falls from .12 to .02, the speed of adjustment falls from
.32 to .05, the marginal inventory/sales ratio falls from .17 to
.04, and the R2 of the equation drops from .71 to .19.
17. These were allquadratic Almori lags running from t to t—ll
with no endpoint constraints.
18. Notice that, in conformity with footnote 11, the one equation
with rapid adjustment also has high estimated serial corrrelation
in the disturbance term.
19. To interpret the magnitudes of the coefficients, it is
necessary to know the units of measurement. In the prewar
regressions, inventories and sales are in billions of 1929
dollars at monthly rates; in the postwar regressions, inventori
andsalesare in billions of 1972 dollars at monthly rates. In
both cases, the interest rate variables are monthly rates in34.
decimal form (that is, .01 means roughly a 12% annual rate of
interest).
20. In the postwar regressions, real wages are an index number
(1972=100); in the prewar regressions, real wages are in real
1929 dollars per hour. Hence the coefficients are not comparable
across periods.35.
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337—341.APPENDIX A: Construction of Total Manufacturing Data
This study employs new data on production, shipments, and
inventory holdings in constant dollars for the manufacturing
sector of the U.S. economy monthly from 1929 to 1942. We
constructed these data using a variety of sources; the details
are presented in this appendix.
I. Production
The primary source is the monthly Federal Reserve Board
index of industrial production (1957-1959 =100)obtained from
the Mitchell data base.1 This index number was converted into a
(seasonally adjusted) series on real output measured in 1929
dollars in the following steps:
1) From the Econoinic Report of the President, real GNP
originating in manufacturing was obtained for the years
1957, 1958, 1959.
2) The average monthly output (the sum of the 3 annual
outputs divided by 36) was converted from 1972 to 1929
dollars using the implicit price deflator for total
goods. In addition, the units were changed from
billions to millions of dollars to be conformable with
shipments and inventory data (see below).
'A computerized data base containing most of the time series
used by Mitchell, available from the Inter—University Consortium
for Political and Social Research.A2.
3) A monthly real output series was created by using this
benchmark and the monthly percentage changes from the
FRB index.
4) The real output series was seasonally adjusted using the
Census Bureau's X—ll program.
II. Inventories
Twobasicdata sources are available. From the Mitchell
data base, and ultimately from Abrainovitz (1950), annual
observations on the value of inventory holdings at the end of
December of each year are available from 1929 to 1942w To create
a monthly time series we used a monthly, seasonally adjusted
index of the value of inventory holdings of the end of each month
from the Conference Board Economic Record of December 26, 1940
(henceforth, CBERJ.Severalobservations are in order.
First, the inventory data from both sources include finished
goods, works in progress, and raw materials. The inclusion of
the latter presents a problem when the inventory data are used in
the production—shipments-inventory investment identity
=X + (Nt+i
-Nt).
Here, the conceptually appropriate inventory concept is the sum
of finished goods and works in progress. Since the identity is
used extensively, the inclusion of materials stocks in
inventories is strictly incorrect, certainly unfortunate, but
unavoidable. An effort will be made below to judge theP.3.
importance of this on all critical calculations.
Second, the series created by deflating the nominal value of
inventories by an (index of) output prices does not accurately
reflectphysical quantities. Thisis the resultof the fact that
inventoryvalues are book values, which depend on the type of
accounting (LIFO vs. FIFO), composition of inventory, and whether
the inventories are valued at cost or marketvalue. Typically,
they are entered at the lower of the two choices. These problems
are not restricted to interwar data, but also are important in
postwar inventory analysis (see West (1983) and Blinder and
Holtz—Eakin (1983)).
Finally, the CBER index is not a comprehensive index of
manufacturing inventories. It is based on industries which
account for only about 1/8 of inventory and shipment values, and
it deliberately excludes data covering "food products, tobacco,
liquors and petroleum, and certain lumber products." (CBER, p.
2)
Thedata used inthis paper were derived in the following
steps:
1) Consider the two series N1 and N2. N1 iscreated by
benchmarking the CBER index to the beginning of year
inventory values given by Abramovitz (actually the December
31 value from the previous year) and N2 is created by using
the end of year values. The nominal, monthly series we use
is a linear combination of N1 and N2 given by:
Nt
=akNlt+(l_ak)N2A4.
where the weight in month k is a decreasing function of the
distance from the start of the year. Specifically, the
weight (ak) for ranuary is 1, February 10/11, March 9/11,
and so forth until ak for December is equal to 0.
2) This series was converted to a real inventory series using
the index (1929=100) of manufacturing prices described
above. As noted above, the fact that inventories are often
valued at cost implies that this procedure will not exactly
mimic movements in physical quantities of inventories.
III. Shipments
Real monthly shipments (in millions of 1929 dollars) were




and a corresponding nominal output series was created by
multiplying the real series by the price index described below.
As mentioned above, the inclusion of raw materials in the
inventory stocks induces an error into the constructed




where Mt is the raw material inventory at the start of month t.
IV. Price Index
The data from Mitchell contain a BLS index ofA5.
manufacturer's prices (1926=100). The price indexwas first
converted to a 1929=100 base and then seasonallyadjusted using
the Census X—ll program.
V. A Check on Data Construction
There is one possible check on theaccuracy of the data
construction used above. The CBER data include amonthly,
seasonally adjusted index of the value of manufacturer's
shipments. Since our method of deriving shipments understates
true shipments by the amount of raw material inventory
investment (see above), it is of interest to see how well it
resembles the movements in the direct measure of shipments
given by the CBER index. In levels, the two measures are in
close accord; thsimp1e correlation between them is .989.
However, the correlation between percentage chpes in the CBER
index and percentage changes in the constructed shipments
series is less satisfactory——.511.
Because of this, we investigated alternative methods of
constructing the data series.
VI. Alternative Construction of Manufacturing Data
The alternative methods of data construction all involve
measuring two of three variables——production, shipments, and
inventories——and then using the identity linking them to impute
the third. Earlier, we described a method which computes
benchmarks for the production and inventory indices and thenA6.
constructs shipments as the residual. Below, we present the
results of three variants of the following procedure: find
benchmarks for shipments and production, and construct
inventory investment using the identity. There is a catch. We
are unable to locate a source containing estimates of the level
of manufacturing shipments in the interwar period to use in
converting the CBER index number into real 1929 dollars.
Instead, we use various years from our basic series, above, as
benchmarks to the CBER shipments index and then compute
inventories accordingly. By doing this, we include in the
benchmark shipments the amount of raw materials inventory
disinvestment during the benchmark month. However, the
remaining monthly movements in raw materials inventory will be
included in the inventory series via the identity. Ideally,
the behavior of our basic series and the alternative will be
quite similar. In practice it is not similar, and the behavior
of the alternative is highly dependent upon the benchmark month
chosen. We computed three variants of 'this alternative method:
Benchmark Month
Variant I February 1929
Variant II January 1932
Variant III December 1942
The relationships among the basic series and our three
variants are summarized by the simple correlations:A7.
Shipments
Basic Variant 1Variant 2Variant 3
Basic 1.0
Variant 1 .981 1.0
Variant 2 .981 1.0 1.0 ——
Variant3 .981 1.0 1.0 1.0
Inventories
Basic Variant 1Variant 2 Variant 3
Basic
- -.1.0
Variant 1 .457 1.0
Variant 2 —.207 —.402 1.0 ——
Variant3 .382 .864 .114 1.0
Inventory Investment
Basic Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
Basic 1.0 —— —— ——
Variant1 —.030 1.0 —— ——
Variant2 —.180 .897 1.0 ——
Variant3 —.150 .936 .995 1.0
VII. Effect of Construction Method on Variance Decomposition
The variance decomposition is the workhorse summaryA8.
measure in this paper. We wish todetermine the size and
direction of the bias induced into the variance measures bythe
alternative methods of constructing the data.
(a) Method 1
This is the method used to derive our "basic"series.
First, production and inventory data arederived and then
shipments are computed using the identity.Assuming that the
indices accurately reflect physical productionand the value of
inventory and that we may deflate using our priceindex (both
are probably wrong):
X't=Xt-tMt
where LMt is raw materials inventory investmentin month t,
is the constructed series, and X is actual shipments.
Accordingly:
+ — 2PatM
We know that p>0 in postwar data. Similarly, we can show:
Cov(x19N)Cov(x,N) +Cov(x,M)-Cov(M,F+W)—
whereF is finished goods inventory investmentand iW is
investment in inventories of workinprocess. Thus:
2 2.
a >i.f.f. 2p <
x -
and:
Cov(x1,N) >Cov(x,N)i.f.f. Cov(x,M) >a
+Cov(AM,iF+W).A9.
Neither of these conditions are satisfied in the postwar data.
Thus, it seems likely that the variance of shipments is biased
down and the covariance of shipments with inventory investment
is biased upwards.
(b) Method 2
In this method, we use the production series derived above
andbenchmarkthe CBER index of the value of shipments using a
shipments value from our basic series. Assuming the same




where X2 isthe constructed shipments series, MBis the
investment in raw materials inventory in the base year,and X3
is shipments in the base period, Clearly, the behaviorof this
series is highly dependent upon the base period chosen. In
particular:
cx2
which is biased either up or down depending upon the






Again the direction of the bias in the constructed series is
unclear.APPENDIX B: Construction of Data for the Durables and
Non—Durables Sectors
This appendix describes the construction of data on
manufacturers production, shipments, inventory, aridpricesfor
durable and nondurable goods. It is worth emphasizing at the
outset that different basic data series and different benchmarks
were used to construct these data then were used to construct the
data for all manufacturing described in Appendix A. Hence, our
datafor durable and nondurable manufacturing in the paper do not
add up to our data for all manufacturing.
I.Inventories
Indicesof the-value of end—of-month inventories, seasonally
adjusted, are available from the CBER for both durables and
non—durables.These indices are not ideal. (See the discussion
in Appendix B.) The indices were converted into a series on the
nominal value (in millions of dollars) of inventories by
benchmarking the indices in December 1937 using information in
the 1937 Census of Manufactures.1 (In particular, volume 2, page
121.) The nominal value of inventories in the durable and
non—durable sectors was computed as the sum of the end of year
inventories in the appropriate (see below) industries from the
Census. Note that this includes raw materials and hence is
11937 was chosen because this Census was used by CBER to
weight its indices.B2.




















This division was chosen so as to conform as closelyas
possible with the categorization used by the BEA on postwar data.
The nominal series were converted to real (1929) dollars
using a (common) price index for total manufacturing.This index
was described in Appendix B.
II. Shipments
The CBER data provide indices of the value of shipments,
monthly and seasonally adjusted, for both typesof goods. A
direct benchmark to convert this index number into dollars wasB3.
not available. Instead, the 1937 Census of Manufactures was
employed to derive an average value of shipments in 1937 which
was equated with the average value of the index in 1937. To do
so, it was necessary to assume that the identity:
=xt+ (nt+i —n)
held in value terms for 1937. That is, the value of shipments
for 1937 was estimated by:
value of shipments =valueof production —
valueof end of year inventory + value of
beginning of year inventory,
where data for the value of production and value of inventory are
taken from the census.
Then, the value of shipments series constructed in this
manner was deflated using the total manufacturing price index;
resulting in a series on real shipments for both durables and
non—durables.
III. Production
Real production was computed using the
shipments—inventoryPrOdUCtiOfl identity. A nominal series was
computed by multiplying the real series by the total
manufacturing price index.
IV. A Check on Data Construction
-Ideally,the sum of the data on, say production, for durableB4.
manufacturing and non—durable manufacturing should exactly match
the data for total manufacturing. Because of the methods
employed here, however, this is far from true. Below are mean
values (in millions of 1929 dollars) of shipments, inventories,
andproductionfor both a) total manufacturing as derived above
andb)the sum of durable andnon—durablemanufacturing as




Shipments 12858.7 4646.8 .392
Inventory 13405.8 9275.7 .713
However, while the levels differ substantially, the
nvements in the two measures of manufacturing behavior are




Thus, while estimates of the behavior of levels of
manufacturing shipments, production, and inventory will vary
depending upon which method is chosen, the overall response to
business cycle conditions will likely be similar.APPENDIX C: Detrending Procedures
I. Whole Economy
A) Method Used in Text
We take Gordon's natural GNP series as the starting point,
extending it to 1983 by assuming (as he did for 1981-82) a 3%
natural growth rate. We then compute "natural final sales" as
XT=OYT
where T is natural GNPand0 is the mean ratio of final sales
to GNP over the period 1929—1983 (excluding 1932 and 1933).
While the ratio is quite stable over time, these latter two years
are obvious out1iers, and were removed for that reason. In
practice it makes little difference;. our computed is .994,
while including 1932 and 1933 changes this only to .996.
The process is completed by computing natural inventory
investment via the identity: =T+NT.Using deviations
from this series gives the variance decomposition in the text.
(Reproduced in the top row of Table C.l.)
B) Alternative (Statistical) Trend




to each of GNP, final sales, and inventories, dropping the years
1930—1939 and 1941—1946 as aberrant. For reason.s described in
the text, this procedure is not entirely satisfactory.
Nevertheless, the variance decomposition derived by detrending in
this manner is shown for comparison in the second row of Table
C.1.
II) Total Manfufacturing
Themethod used in the text was:
thod (A): Log—linear interpolation between1929 and1941.
Wealso experimented with:
Method (B): Log—linear interpolation using 1929 and 1940; and
Method (C): Log—linear trend line fitted to all months in
1929—1941.
The variance decompositions for each type of detrending is
shown in Table C.l.C3.
TABLEC..1
2 2 2 Coy 2 22 2Corp.
(x,LN) Cy'Cx x"N (x,LN)
Total Economy
(ECOPOMIC) 1309.9 1210.4 20.943.2 1.082 57.9 .271
Total Economy
(STATISTICAL) 951.4965.6 23.9 70.5.985 40.4 .464
Manufacturing
(METHOD A) 7.39 6.85.084 .270 1.079 81.8 .250
Manufacturing
(METHOD B) 10.35 9.73.084 .371 1.063 116.1 .318
Manufacturing
(METHOD C) 7.29 6.77.084 .276 1.076 80.8 .259
Note: In billions of 1929 dollars for manufacturing and billions
of 1972 dollars for total economy.